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new world of retirement income security in America, including a discussion of how a low return 
environment (e.g., low interest rates) exacerbates existing retirement income security challenges. We 
then document how older Americans have responded to the evolving retirement income landscape, 
especially when and how they exit the labor force, and we explore how continued work later in life can 
help mitigate some of the anticipated retirement security challenges. We then pose some important 
outstanding questions. The implications of societal aging depend in large part on how we harness or 
squander the labor resources of older Americans. 
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Chapter 7
Challenges and Opportunities of Living
and Working Longer
Joseph F. Quinn and Kevin E. Cahill
Older persons contemplating retirement today are more exposed to market
forces and ﬁnancial insecurity than were their predecessors, due to demo-
graphic change, the trend to deﬁned contribution plans, and macroeco-
nomic volatility (Quinn and Cahill 2016). With public sector budgets also
strained, many older individuals must either extend their working lives or
reduce their standards of living in retirement. The ﬁnancial well-being of
older households now appears to be more cyclical than in the past, with the
outlook for retirement income security being stable or improving in a strong
macroeconomic climate, but becoming unstable and declining during and
following economic downturns. This choice presents older workers and
their employers with both challenges and opportunities.
In response to these changes, some Americans are adapting, although the
adequacy of their preparations remains to be seen. A century-long trend
toward earlier retirement came to a halt in the 1980s and now has reversed,
although the rate of reversal may now be slowing down (Quinn et al. 2011;
Munnell 2015a). The rise in labor force participation at older ages is all the
more notable because it is occurring while labor force participation among
male and female workers aged 25 to 54 has declined steadily since 2000
(Hipple 2016). Older Americans represent a ﬂexible workforce that is
willing to change employers, occupations, and work intensity late in life
(Johnson et al. 2009; Cahill et al. 2015a). This ﬂexibility may serve as an
antidote to the retirement income security challenge lying ahead (Smyer
et al. 2009; James et al. 2016).
For the foreseeable future, individuals are likely to play a more central
role in determining their own ﬁnancial security in old age. Policymakers
need to focus on the incentives facing older individuals and evaluate how
these incentives can encourage continued work later in life among those
who can do so, while protecting those who cannot. In this chapter we discuss
important changes in the retirement environment, how older workers have
been responding to these changes, and the signiﬁcant challenges still ahead.
Policy Concerns Regarding Retirement Security
Both long-term trends in demographic aging and the current macroeconomic
environment challenge our ability to maintain living standards as we age.
Moreover, there are legitimate concerns regarding the income sources on
which retirees have to rely.
Nearly two-thirds of older persons’ income comes from sources about
which potential retirees might be concerned: social security, pension beneﬁts
(including annuities), and asset income (US Social Security Administration
2016a). For those age 65+ in the lowest three income quintiles, the reliance is
even higher: 85, 91, and 83 percent of total income comes from these three
sources, with social security by far the most important (see Figure 7.1 and
Table 7.1).
Social Security. The progressive nature of social security’s beneﬁt calcula-
tion formula disproportionately rewards those with lower lifetime earnings,
providing lower absolute beneﬁts but higher replacement rates. Yet the
system and its recipients face many concerns ahead. The permanent beneﬁt
reduction for claiming at the Earliest Age of Eligibility—still age 62—will
Social Security
33.2%
Earnings
32.2%
Pensions
20.9%
Asset Income
9.7%
Other 
(including public 
assistance)
4.0%
Figure 7.1. Shares of aggregate income for aged units 65+, by source (2014, %)
Note: Totals do not necessarily equal the sum of the rounded components. Aged units include
married couples with a least one person aged 65 or older and non-married persons aged 65
or older.
Source: US Social Security Administration (2016a).
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increase from 20 to 30 percent, as the Full Retirement Age (FRA) rises from
65 to 67 for those born after 1959 (Board of Trustees of OASDI 2016).1 This
higher offset for those who claim beneﬁts early disproportionately affects
lower-income workers and those in physically-demanding occupations who
may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to postpone beneﬁt receipt until their FRA or beyond
(Rutledge and Coe 2012).
Social security replacement rates (the ratio of beneﬁts to prior earnings)
for the average earner retiring at age 65 will decline from 42 percent in 1985
to a projected 36 percent in 2030.2 In addition, the Medicare Part B pre-
miums that are subtracted from social security beneﬁts are rising faster than
the cost of living, and more recipients will ﬁnd part of their beneﬁts subject
to federal income taxation in the future.3 When these two additional factors
are considered, according to Munnell (2015b), the average replacement
rate will drop even further, to 31 percent.
These pessimistic calculations assume that future social security beneﬁts
will be paid according to the current scheduled beneﬁt formula, an opti-
mistic assessment. This may well not occur because Social Security faces
substantial long-term funding issues. Annual expenditures already exceed
(non-interest) revenues, and without reform on the revenue and/or the
expenditure side, the Social Security (OASDI) Trust Fund will be depleted
by 2034. At that point, Social Security will be able to pay less than 80 percent
of promised beneﬁts (Board of Trustees of OASDI 2016). While reforms
may occur in the interim, many proposed options spell trouble for future
retirees since they involve beneﬁt reductions, either explicitly or implicitly,
through additional delays in the FRA.4 The last major reform, in 1983, did
just that, moving the FRA from 65 to 66, and then to 67, thereby lowering
the beneﬁts received at any given age.5
Employer pensions. About half of all employees in the private sector are
covered by an employer pension on their current jobs and about 44 percent
of those aged 65+ currently receive income from a pension other than Social
TABLE . Shares of aggregate income by source and quintile of total money income
(2014)
Bottom Second Middle Fourth Top
Source Quintile (%) Quintile (%) Quintile (%) Quintile (%) Quintile (%)
Social Security 80.7 80.5 61.2 39.4 15.4
Earnings 3.0 5.3 12.6 23.7 45.2
Pensions 3.0 7.6 17.8 26.0 22.3
Asset income 1.8 2.4 4.1 5.7 14.0
Other 11.5 4.3 4.4 5.3 3.1
Source: US Social Security Administration (2016b).
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Security (US Social Security Administration 2016b). Although pension
coverage has remained steady over time, the type of pension coverage
provided has changed signiﬁcantly, from traditional deﬁned beneﬁt (DB)
to deﬁned contribution (DC) plans.6 DB pensions provide a deﬁned
monthly beneﬁt at retirement (as does Social Security, a public DB plan),
typically based on earnings and tenure with the ﬁrm.7 By contrast, in a DC
plan, the employer’s only obligation is to make speciﬁed contributions to an
account designated by the employee. The size of the account at retirement
depends on the amount of these contributions and how these investments
perform over the years.
In the United States, the percentage of workers with DB plans has plum-
meted from 88 percent in the early 1980s (including 26 percent who had
both a DB and a DC plan) to only 30 percent in 2013 (including 13 percent
with both). Over the same time, DC coverage only has risen from 12 to
71 percent (or including those covered by both from 38 to 84 percent;
Munnell 2014). Nevertheless, accumulations in DC accounts remain rela-
tively small. In 2013, for example, workers aged 55–64 with a DC plan had
median 401(k) and individual retirement account (IRA) accumulations of
about $110,000, enough to purchase a joint and survivor annuity of only
about $500/month (Munnell 2014; Dushi et al. 2015).8 Mean retirement
account savings in 401(k)s, IRAs and Keogh plans do rise with age, as
expected, averaging about $125,000 for those aged 50–55, and $164,000
for those 56–61 (see Figure 7.2). Because nearly half of American families
$0
$50,000
$100,000
$150,000
$200,000
$250,000
1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
32–37 38–43 44–49 50–55 56–61 Working age (32–61) 
Figure 7.2. Mean retirement account savings of families by age (1989 to 2013)
Note: Figures in 2013 dollars. Retirement account savings include 401(k)s, IRAs, and Keogh
plans.
Source: Morrissey (2016).
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have no retirement account savings at all, the median (50th percentile)
value among those aged 32–61 is only $5,000, and is under $10,000 for all
except the oldest age group (56–61), whose median was only $17,000
(Morrissey 2016).9 These amounts are modest at best, especially considering
the likelihood of ﬁnancial shocks in retirement.
Medicare and Medicaid. The ﬁscal challenges facing Social Security are
modest and manageable compared to those facing Medicare and Medicaid.
Social Security (OASI) reforms confront political resistance since many
politicians do not want to be on record supporting increases in social
security taxes or decreases in beneﬁts, especially when Social Security is
likely to meet its full obligations for the next 15 years or so. By contrast,
Medicare and Medicaid reforms are much more difﬁcult, because they
involve not just checks to recipients but rather the provision of healthcare
to the elderly. Federal spending on healthcare is projected to rise to almost
8 percent of GDP by 2040, and then head still higher, while social security
beneﬁt payouts reach amaximum of about 6 percent of GDP (see Figure 7.3).
Medicare’s Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (Medicare Part A) is currently
projected to be depleted by 2028, compared to 2034 for OASDI (Board of
Trustees, Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical
Insurance Trust Funds 2016).10 Moreover, Medicaid costs are already
0.0
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Other Noninterest Spendingb
Figure 7.3. Federal spending as a percentage of GDP, by component (2000 to 2045)
Notes:
a Consists of spending on Medicare (net of offsetting receipts), Medicaid, and the Children’s
Health Insurance Program, as well as outlays to subsidize health insurance purchased through
the marketplaces established under the Affordable Care Act and related spending.
b Consists of all federal spending other than that for Social Security, the major health care
programs, and net interest.
Source: Derived from Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (2010).
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burdening state budgets. For those contemplating retirement, the pending
insolvency of Medicare and Medicaid is additional cause for concern.
Savings. Few older Americans have saved much for retirement. Nearly
60 percent of American workers (and over 40 percent of those age 45+)
own less than $25,000 in ﬁnancial assets, excluding the value of their
primary residence and DB pension plans (Helman et al. 2016). Since life
expectancy at 65 is currently about two decades, decades in which out-of-
pocket medical expenses will increase for many, these modest assets provide
very little ﬁnancial cushion late in life.
Effects of the Current Low-Return Environment
The current low-return environment is exacerbating these challenges for
older individuals. One downside of a low-return environment is lower
returns on assets. Yet this has also been accompanied by lower rates of
inﬂation (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2016; US Bureau of Labor
Statistics 2016). Since social security retirement beneﬁts are indexed for
inﬂation, many older persons will not be affected. Nevertheless, timing
issues can still be a concern. Retirees who lock in to annuities during a
low-return period stand to lose if interest rates rise, while those who bought
annuities during the earlier higher-return environment gain as the nominal
returns on their assets are maintained when interest rates decline.11
The low return environment could also impact some older workers’
decisions about when to leave the labor force and claim beneﬁts. Overall,
asset income provides about 10 percent of income for Americans aged 65+.
That percentage rises slightly with age and dramatically by income quintile,
from less than 3 percent for those in the bottom two quintiles to 14 percent
for those in the top quintile, many of whom are still working (US Social
Security Administration 2016b). The persistence of the low-return environ-
ment could very well deter retirement for these workers. Other individuals
might choose to take on more ﬁnancial risk to achieve higher average
returns, at the cost of higher variation in returns.
Another important consequence of low returns is the impact on incen-
tives to save and to take on debt, especially for younger Americans. The
Federal Reserve Bank has kept interest rates at historical lows since the
Great Recession, in part to induce spending and spur economic growth
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2016; Conti-Brown, this
volume). Yet increased spending implies lower savings, and low interest rates
can encourage individuals to incur debt. In turn, such changes in behavior
can alter the ﬁnancial outlook for younger and older workers alike, at a time
when household ﬁnancial security is already a real concern.
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Retirement Preparedness
Taking into account each of these threads, it is of interest to assess the
retirement preparedness of older households. One approach is to estimate
household replacement rates, the ratio of income post- versus pre-retirement,
assuming retirement at age 65 (Munnell et al. 2014). Those who fall more
than 10 percent below what is required to maintain their prior standard of
living are judged to be at risk and inadequately prepared for retirement.
Figure 7.4 shows the results across time. In 2010 and 2013, more than half of
American households had accumulated less than 90 percent of what they
needed to maintain their pre-retirement standard of living.12 The index
jumped by 20 percent from pre- (2007) to post- (2010) recession, but this
continued a long-term trend, up from near 30 percent in the 1980s to the
high 30s in the 1990s to the mid-40s just before the recession. The index
showed little improvement between 2010 and 2013, and it will be interesting
to see the extent of the recovery (a decline in the index) when new data
become available.
An alternative and more optimistic view is presented by Schieber (2015),
who argues that workers will have larger deﬁned contribution balances at
retirement than do current retirees. Yet even so, he concludes that ‘many
low earners face retirement with inadequate resources to provide an income
that will allow them to maintain either a socially acceptable standard of
living or one that matches that achieved while they were working’ (Schieber
2015: 16).
0
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Figure 7.4. The national retirement risk index (1983 to 2013, %)
Source: Munnell (2015b).
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What Might Concerned Potential Retirees Do?
Later in life, as people approach traditional retirement ages, the options are
limited. An answer for many is simple—either consume less during retire-
ment, or work longer before retirement. The latter can be either on a career
job, or on one or more post-career bridge jobs, before complete labor force
withdrawal.
Working longer provides additional lifetime earnings and the opportunity
for incremental saving, augments the size of eventual pension and social
security beneﬁts (especially if receipt of social security beneﬁts, which rise by
about 8 percent per year of delay, are postponed while working), and also
reduces the number of years of retirement during which these augmented
assets will be consumed. The numerator (retirement resources) increases
while the denominator (years of retirement) declines. This message has
already hit home, since a trend toward delayed labor-force withdrawal has
been underway for three decades.
Retirement trends: when do people retire? As seen in Table 7.2, the labor
force participation rate of men aged 62 increased between 1985 and 2016 by
nearly 20 percent (from 51 to 60 percent) after a century of decline. For
men age 65, 68, and 70, the changes were even more dramatic, increasing by
approximately 50, 60, and 70 percent over the past three decades.13 For
older women, the increases are even larger. Since 1985, the labor force
participation rate of women aged 62 has risen by over 60 percent (from 32 to
51 percent), and for those age 65, 68, and 70, the rates have approximately
doubled. Older Americans are already working longer than they did a short
time ago.
These increased participation rates of older Americans are all the more
remarkable because they came at a time when participation labor market
attachment of younger and middle-aged workers has declined (Hipple
2016). Among Americans aged 25–54, labor force participation rates
declined about 4 percent between 2000 and 2015 (from 92 to 88 percent
for men, and 77 to 74 percent for women), in stark contrast to the signiﬁcant
increases among older Americans. In part, the reversal of the early retire-
ment trend could be due to the reductions in the social security earnings
test, eliminated for those above their FRA, and increases in the delayed
retirement credit from 3 to 8 percent per year of delay. On the employer
pension side, the move from DB to DC plans removed strong retirement
incentives, since DB pensions often paid lower expected discounted values
after the earliest age of eligibility. This implicit pay cut does not occur in a
DC plan.
Retirement patterns: How do people retire? Recent cohorts have redeﬁned
the meaning of the term ‘retirement.’ Three common pathways from career
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employment to complete labor force withdrawal have been identiﬁed:
phased retirement (a reduction in hours with one’s current employer),
bridge employment (a job change following career employment, with or
without a change in hours), and job re-entry (a subsequent return to the
labor force following ‘retirement’—sometimes known as ‘unretirement’)
(Kantarci and van Soest 2008; Maestas 2010; Cahill et al. 2015b; 2016).
These retirement patterns are usually studied subsequent to career employ-
ment (full-time work for a signiﬁcant duration), but job changes later in
life are also common among those who have never had a career job (Cahill
et al. 2012).
Bridge employment is the most prevalent form of gradual retirement
among those with career jobs (Quinn 1999; Cahill et al. 2006, 2015b). An
analysis of three cohorts of older Americans from the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS) over a 20-year period showed that between 50 and 60 percent of
older career workers moved to a bridge job following career employment.
The majority of career workers did not follow a ‘traditional’ pathway directly
TABLE . US labor force participation rates by age and sex (1985 to 2016, %)
Men
55 60 62 65 68 70 72
1985 83.7 71.0 50.9 30.5 20.5 15.9 14.9
1990 85.3 70.5 52.6 31.9 23.4 17.1 16.4
1995 81.1 68.9 51.3 33.5 22.4 20.6 16.0
2000 79.8 66.2 53.0 35.9 28.1 20.2 18.5
2005 80.6 67.7 57.7 39.7 32.2 23.8 21.6
2010 82.2 69.0 59.0 42.7 33.4 24.7 23.9
2015 80.6 70.3 60.5 44.8 32.6 27.3 22.7
2016 80.2 70.9 60.1 46.3 32.6 27.1 23.2
% Change
1985–2016 ˗4 0 18 52 59 70 56
Women
55 60 62 65 68 70 72
1985 55.5 41.9 31.5 16.2 12.1 9.0 8.2
1990 59.8 44.8 34.9 20.6 15.2 11.7 8.0
1995 64.6 49.2 36.3 22.3 15.2 10.7 9.8
2000 65.2 51.5 38.7 23.2 16.6 10.9 10.8
2005 69.8 55.7 44.6 28.3 20.6 16.7 11.8
2010 72.8 61.0 49.7 33.7 23.7 17.3 14.6
2015 70.2 57.6 50.1 35.6 24.4 18.7 13.9
2016 68.0 58.6 50.7 35.0 24.3 18.1 14.5
% Change
1985–2016 23 40 61 116 101 101 77
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2017).
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from career employment to complete labor force withdrawal. Re-entry was
the next most common form of gradual retirement. About 15 percent of
career workers who were out of the labor force for at least two HRS survey
waves years later returned to paid work (Cahill et al. 2011).
The least prevalent form of gradual departure was phased retirement,
with only 10 percent of workers reducing their hours on a career job by
20 percent or more (Cahill et al. 2015b). Phased retirement would seem to
be a preferable exit route since workers could continue to capitalize on
accumulated speciﬁc human capital in a familiar environment. Factors on
both the supply and demand sides of the labor market help explain its low
prevalence. On the labor supply side, individuals might choose to change
employers to alter the type or intensity of the work they do, or prefer to
move to warmer climes or closer to grandchildren. Lower hours on a career
job might decrease subsequent pension beneﬁts if they are based on the last
few years of earnings. The concept of ‘encore jobs’—those with a social
impact—is also attractive to many ( Johnson et al. 2009; Quinn 2010;
Alboher 2012), and surveys show that older Americans care about the
non-ﬁnancial aspects of their work (AARP 2014).
On the demand side, legal and regulatory requirements can present
obstacles for some employers. Regulations designed to restrict tax-deferred
beneﬁts for highly compensated individuals seem to have limited the possi-
bility of phased retirement for older workers. Rules regarding pension
distributions can also complicate phased retirement offerings ( Johnson
2011). When faced with the choice between full-time work or changing
employers, some workers might decide to leave the labor force entirely,
and retain the option of labor market re-entry as a contingency plan.
Another important barrier to continued work later in life on a career job
or elsewhere is physical or mental health. Increases in longevity and
improvements in overall health have reduced the percentage of workers
for whom physical health presents a barrier to continued work, while a shift
away from physically demanding jobs over time has also expanded options
for older workers (Steuerle et al. 1999; Penner et al. 2002; Munnell et al.
2004). Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that continued work
later in life may be difﬁcult for a portion of the labor force.
Future retirement trends. One might expect the retirement patterns of
future retirees to differ from those of the past for at least three reasons in
addition to those already mentioned: the impacts of the 2008–2009 Great
Recession, the subsequent sluggish recovery (Desilver 2014), and the per-
sistent low-return environment. Older Americans who had planned to live
on investment asset returns may alter their retirement plans. While equity
returns since 2010 have been strong (Wall Street Journal 2016), older
Americans relying on investments are exposed to ﬁnancial losses in the
event of another market downturn.
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A preview of future retirement trends is available from the HRS. We have
compared the retirement patterns of the Early Boomers (aged 51–56 in
2004) and Mid-Boomers (aged 51–56 in 2010), to those of two older HRS
cohorts, the HRS Core (aged 51–61 in 1992) and the War Babies (aged
51–56 in 1998). In each cohort we selected individuals working at a full-time
career (FTC) job at the time of their ﬁrst interview.14 We then followed
these people over time and used each respondent’s work history to identify
his pathway to retirement (directly, or via phased retirement, bridge job, or
job re-entry). We found that bridge employment continues to be the most
common gradual retirement pathway for Early and Mid-Boomers, among
those who left career employment (see Table 7.3). Few Early Boomers
reduced hours in career employment by 20 percent or more.
In other words, the latest data available suggest that recent cohorts are
following the same pathways to retirement as did their predecessors, despite
their exposure to market ﬂuctuations and the low return environment since
2008. The concept of retirement as a one-time, permanent event does not
apply for most older Americans today and has not for decades.15 This
observed ﬂexibility of older workers is good news and offers opportunities
to address the challenges of societal aging.
Conclusion
The persistent low-return environment appears to be inﬂuencing older
individuals’ decisions to hold and take on additional debt. The percentage
of individuals aged 65 and older with debt increased from 30 percent in
1998 to 43 percent in 2010, with the average leverage ratio—total household
debt divided by total household assets—doubling over the same period from
6 percent to 13 percent (Karamcheva 2013). Further, 11 percent of Middle
Boomers are now in debt; i.e., have negative net worth (The Center for
Retirement Research 2017). More research is needed to understand the
degree to which older Americans with sizable debt are vulnerable to a rise in
interest rates. Those relying on ﬁnancial assets in a low-return environment
may be tempted to increase asset returns by accepting more investment risk,
as well as work longer to supplement their retirement savings. Lusardi and
Mitchell (2017) also show that older American women have more debt
today than did previous cohorts, and this is positively associated with older
women being more likely to work currently, as well as plan to continue to
work in the future. To the extent that workers are physically able to work
longer, their additional labor supply can be beneﬁcial to these individuals,
to their employers, and to society as a whole, as more goods and services are
produced to be distributed over an aging population.
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Notes
1. Johnson et al. (2013) report that social security claiming rates at age 62 have
declined over the past decade. Among men born in 1943 and 1944, 45 percent
claimed beneﬁts at age 62 compared with 55 percent of those born between 1935
and 1937. Approximately one half of women born in 1943 and 1944 claimed social
security beneﬁts at age 62, down from 60 percent among those born between 1935
and 1937.
2. The replacement rates reported by the Board of Trustees of OASDI, and refer-
enced in Munnell (2015b), are based on social security beneﬁt amounts as a
percentage of career-average earnings, indexed for wage growth (Board of
Trustees of OASDI 2013). Biggs and Springstead (2008) measure pre-retirement
earnings in different ways (wage-indexed average earnings, inﬂation-adjusted
average earnings, ﬁnal earnings (based on a ﬁve-year average), and a present
value of lifetime earnings), and do so on an individual basis and a shared basis for
couples. The latter authors ﬁnd that replacement rates vary depending on how
pre-retirement income is measured. On a shared basis, for example, the median
beneﬁt replacement rate varies from 39 percent for wage-indexed average earn-
ings to 55 percent for ﬁnal earnings among individuals aged 64 to 66 in 2040 in
the middle lifetime earnings quintile.
3. Couples with ‘combined income’ of over $32,000 and individuals over $25,000 pay
income tax on 50 percent of their social security beneﬁts. At combined incomes of
$44,000 and individual incomes of $34,000, 85 percent of Social Security beneﬁts
are taxable. These thresholds are not indexed for inﬂation, so the percentage of
recipients paying taxes on social security beneﬁts will rise over time, from about
10 percent in 1985 to about 40 percent today, and an estimated half of recipient
households by 2030 (Munnell 2015b).
4. Waiting longer for a given beneﬁt implies getting a smaller beneﬁt at any given age,
which is an across-the-board beneﬁt cut, although it is rarely described that way.
5. Many recent reform proposals do the same. For example, the 2010 Simpson-
Bowles report, The Moment of Truth, proposed (among other changes) lowering
beneﬁts for higher-income recipients, increasing both the FRA and the Early
Eligibility Age (which is still 62 for all) in step with future longevity increases,
and lowering the annual cost-of-living adustment, all three of which would
lower future social security beneﬁts relative to the current provisions (National
Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform 2010: 54). The Congressional
Budget Ofﬁce (2010) discussed ﬁve categories of Social Security reforms, three of
which would lower future beneﬁts, via formula changes to reduce initial beneﬁts,
additional increases in the FRA, and reductions in cost-of-living adjustments. In
fact, a majorityof the 30 proposals the CBO analyzed would lower future beneﬁts
(Congressional Budget Ofﬁce 2010). While none of these have been imple-
mented yet, they do suggest that reasonable reformers will include beneﬁt cuts
in their recommendations.
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6. Some analysts disagree with the assessment that coverage has been ﬂat. Munnell
(2014), using the 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), argued that among
prime-age private sector workers, the percent participating in an employer
pension on the current job has drifted from 50 percent down to the low 40s.
Morrissey (2016), also using the 2013 SCF, estimated that participation by
respondents or their spouses declined from 60 percent in 2001 to 53 percent
in 2013. In contrast, Dushi et al. (2015) estimated that participation rates
increased slightly from 58 percent in 2006 to 61 percent in 2012. While these
participation rate estimates differ, there is unanimous agreement about the
precipitous decline in traditional DB plans in the private sector.
7. Schieber (2015: 13) pointed out that many DB plans no longer automatically pay
monthly beneﬁts, but rather ‘have restructured their plans so they also pay
beneﬁts at termination in the form of lump sums; most terminating workers . . .
choose lump-sum payments over annuities.’Those who do claim lump sums then
face the longevity risk facing deﬁned contribution recipients, living beyond one’s
assets.
8. Ownership of DC assets is highly correlated with income. According to Munnell
(2014), two thirds of those aged 55–64 in the fourth and ﬁfth income quintiles
had DC accounts, averaging $132,000 and $450,000 respectively. DC participa-
tion fell to 22 percent and 48 percent in the lowest two quintiles, and they
averaged only $13,000 and $53,000 as they approached retirement (Munnell
2014: see Table 7.2). And many have no DC coverage at all.
9. Not surprisingly, retirement saving accounts are much more prevalent among
high-income families. In 2013, only 8 and 30 percent of those in the lowest two
quintiles had any such accounts, compared to about half of those in the middle
quintile, and nearly 70 and 90 percent of those in the highest two quintiles.
While over 60 percent of (non-Hispanic) white families had retirement accounts,
only 26 and 40 percent of Hispanics and blacks did (Morrissey 2016, Charts 9 and
10). Schieber (2015) makes this same point, that utilization of retirement savings
plans is highly correlated with income, and therefore that high-income workers
are more likely to be well prepared to meet retirement needs.
10. Medicare Part A is the only component of Medicare that is funded by the FICA
tax and that has a Trust Fund. Parts B (supplementary medical insurance) and
D (prescription drug beneﬁt) are funded annually from a variety of other
sources.
11. The potential loss of retirement income due to low returns can be substantial. For
example, the monthly payment on an annuity with a starting principal of $250,000,
an interest rate of 5 percent, and a 20-year period is $1,632. At an interest rate of
2 percent the monthly payment is only $1,263—nearly a quarter less.
12. The Survey of Consumer Finances is conducted every three years. Munnell et al.
(2017) compares its estimates of preparedness with the self-assessments of pre-
paredness by the individual households in the 2013 SCF. In aggregate, the news
is about the same: the authors found that 52 percent were inadequately prepared
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compared to 57 percent of the household themselves. But they were not always
the same households. A majority, 57 percent of the households, agreed with the
authors’ assessment. Others were conﬁdent when they should not have been
(19 percent; often with a DC plan whose income generating potential they
overestimated) or were concerned when the authors forecasted they could
generate 90 percent of their pre-retirement income (24 percent; including
some who underestimated the income-producing potential of owning a home).
13. The average age of retirement for men, as deﬁned by Burtless and Quinn (2002)
also reversed. It declined from 65 in 1976 to 63 in 1980, and then increased, in
almost symmetric fashion, back to 65 by 2009.
14. A full-time career job is deﬁned as one with 1,600 or more hours per year and ten
or more years of job tenure.
15. Data from the old Retirement History Survey (RHS), conducted from 1969 to
1979, suggest that gradual retirement has been the norm since then (Ruhm 1990).
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